【新唐人北京時間2018年08月28日訊】 【世事關心】（477）中美是否彼此誤判40年？：這次來真的了，川普（特朗普）總統正在大幅度調整對華政策；而且，民主黨人在此問題上與川普站在同一陣線，這在當今的美國簡直是不可思議。是什麽改變了美國對華政策基本思路？一言以蔽之，美國終於看透了中共。
尼克松總統訪華使兩國開始了長達40年的互動，但美國從一開始就錯判了中國嗎？
President Nixon’s visit to China started a 40-year long interaction between the two countries, but did America get China wrong from the very beginning?
Bill Gertz（《華盛頓自由燈塔》資深編輯／senior editor of the Washington Free Beacon）：「他們沒有從根本上理解中國共產主義制度的本質。」
「They didn’t fundamentally understand the nature of the communist system in China. 」
從克林頓時代到奧巴馬時代，以追求利潤為導向的商務活動主導著美中政策，結果是什麼，吸取的教訓又是什麼呢？
A profit-driven business sector dominated the U.S.- China policy from the Clinton era to the Obama era, What’s the result and what’s the lesson learned?
Bill Gertz（《華盛頓自由燈塔》資深編輯／senior editor of the Washington Free Beacon）：「現在我們沒有看到中國變緩和了，沒有看到中國在朝著民主制度轉變。事實是我們看到的恰恰相反。」
「 We have not seen a moderating of China. We have not seen an evolution towards a democratic system. In fact, we’ve seen just the opposite.」
在過去的40年裡，中國是否也錯判了美國？這將產生什麼影響呢？
For the past 40 years, did China also get America wrong? And what impact will that have?
蕭茗（Host/ Simone Gao）：歡迎收看《世事關心》，我是蕭茗。這次是來真的了，川普總統正在大幅調整美國對華政策。而且，民主黨人在此問題上與川普站在同一陣線，這在當今的美國簡直是不可思議。是什麼改變了美國對華政策基本思路，一言以蔽之，美國終於看透了中共，美國再也不指望中共能有民主轉型。更重要的是，再也不指望從中共的經濟增長中分一杯羹，政治體制、經濟體制上，都不再指望中共了。問題在於，最開始美國是怎樣想的，為什麼對此會抱有希望？過去四十年，美國對華政策的主要基點不是在地緣政治中爭霸嗎，是否這一基點被大公司的貪婪侵蝕了？還是一廂情願但最終一場空。或者這是由於文化差異帶來的誤判？從過去四十年對華政策的失敗中，美國學到的最重要教訓是什麼？我們無法在24分鐘的節目裡，從頭梳理美中關係的來龍去脈，我們將著重分析上面提到的要點，下面讓我們開始吧。
Hello, Welcome to 《Zooming In》, I’m Simone Gao. It is official，America is experiencing a MAJOR overhaul in China policy under President Donald Trump. And guess what? This time the DEMOCRATS are ALSO with the president. This is almost SURREAL In today’s America. What has changed in America’s thinking about China? If I have to summarize in ONE sentence, it would be. America FINALLY starts to see China AS it is. That is, No more hopes for a gradual transformation into democracy. No more hope for a peaceful rise of the dragon and most importantly. No More hopes for sharing that sweet pie of a prosperous Chinese economy in a mutually beneficial way. All these hopes are gone. But the question is, how did they come about in the FIRST place, In the past 40 years, Is America’s China policy driven by hegemonic ambitions in geopolitics? Has it been eroded by corporate greed? Is it a unfortunate result of wishful thinking? Or does the misunderstanding simply reflect cultural differences? What is the most important lesson America should learn from this 40-year long unsuccessful China experience? We don’t have the luxury for a detailed chronologization of the U.S.- China relations in my 24 minute-program, INSTEAD, we will pick out the pieces that addresses the aspects mentioned above and analyze them. So, let’s get started.
第二次世界大戰後，世界進入另一種地緣政治緊張局勢，即冷戰。這是包括蘇聯及其衛星國家的東方集團與包括美國，其北約盟國和其它國家的西方集團之間的對抗。在20世紀60年代末的冷戰高峰期，中蘇關係的惡化使情況變得更加複雜。在蘇聯即將以核武器摧毀中國關鍵的政治和軍事目標的前刻，尼克松政府認為一個強大的中國的存在將最好地服務於美國的利益，因為蘇聯是最具威脅的對手。
After World War II, the world entered into another state of geopolitical tension, namely, the Cold War. It is a confrontation between an Eastern Bloc that includes the Soviet Union and its satellite States, and a Western Bloc that includes the United States, its NATO allies and others. At the height of the cold war in the late 1960s, a deterioration of a Sino-Soviet relationship complicated the situation. On the brink of nuclear attack by the Soviets to destroy China’s key political and military targets, the Nixon administration decided the existence of a strong China would best serve America’s national interest because it was the Soviet Union that was the country’s biggest adversary.
尼克松遏止了蘇聯並接受了中國的橄欖枝。他於1972年訪華，最終促成了兩國正式建交。在福特和尼克松執政期間，美國向中國提供軍事情報和技術。他甚至承諾抵消蘇聯對中國的威脅。
Nixon deterred the Soviet Union and accepted the olive branch from China. His visit to China in 1972 eventually led to the diplomatic relations between the two nations. During the Ford and the Nixon administration, the U.S. offered military intelligence and technologies to China. It even promised to neutralize the Soviet threat to China.
根據美國前官員，國際暢銷書《百年馬拉松》的作者邁克爾·皮爾斯伯里（Michael Pillsbury）的說法，里根總統儘管對中國共產黨的性質及其前任的中國政策深表懷疑，但卻對中國提升軍力提供了最大的幫助。里根總統簽署的幾項國家安全決策指令（NSDD）允許五角大樓向中國出售先進的空中、地面、海軍和導彈技術，將人民解放軍變為世界級的戰鬥力量。它甚至開通了兩國之間的核合作與技術開發。但與他的前任不同，里根增加了一個警示性條件，讓美國的援助以中國疏遠蘇聯並自由化其獨裁體制為前提。但是，這些先決條件基本上被忽視了。
According to Michael Pillsbury, a former U.S. official and author of an international bestseller “The Hundred-Year Marathon”, President Reagan, although deeply skeptical about the Chinese Communist Party’s nature and his predecessor’s China policy, did the most to boost China’s military. Several National Security Decision Directive ( )signed by President Reagan permitted the Pentagon to sell advanced air, ground, naval, and missile technology to the Chinese to transform the People’s Liberation Army into a world-class fighting force. It even inaugurated nuclear cooperation and development between the two countries. But unlike his predecessors, Reagan added a caveat to make the U.S. assistance dependent on China’s allienization to the Soviet Union and liberalization of its authoritarian system. However, those conditions were largely ignored.
美國在軍事和技術上的對華援助正是共產黨希望在農業、工業、國防、和技術四個關鍵領域實現現代化的大戰略所求之不得的。該戰略最初由毛澤東精心策劃，毛之後的最高領導人鄧小平將此戰略推向了一個新的高度。鄧小平認為，經濟改革和科技發展是中國改變命運的關鍵，他得到了卡特總統的大力幫助。這項工作包括接納大量中國公派留學生到美國學習，主要是在科學和工程領域。鄧的理念很簡單，中國需要科學和技術，最快捷的辦法是從美國拿。
America’s continuous effort to boost China militarily and technologically falls right into the Communist Party’s grand strategy of Modernization in four key areas, agriculture, industry, national defence, and technology. The strategy was first crafted by Mao Zedong. But it was Deng Xiaoping, the paramount leader after Mao, who took the strategy to a new level. Deng believed economic reform together with development in science and technology holds the key for China to change its fate. He received substantial assistance from President Jimmy Carter. The effort included accepting a great number of government associated Chinese students to study in America, mainly in the field of science and engineering. Deng’s rational is simple, China needs science and technology and the quickest way to get it is to take it from America.
蕭茗（Host/ Simone Gao）：鄧小平的名言是「韜光養晦」就是增強實力隱藏野心。他說中共是「摸著石頭過河」沒有總體戰略。這個比喻是部分正確的，中共可能並不完全清楚如何建立一個強大的經濟帝國。但是有一件事他們從不含糊，中共必須是中國的唯一統治者，而且絕不能動搖，美國是否一開始就錯看了中共。我與比爾·葛茨先生討論了此問題。他是《華盛頓自由燈塔》的高級編輯，《中共威脅》的作者。
Deng has a famous saying 「tao guang yang hui」. It means to hide your ambitions and build your capability. He claimed that China had no grand strategy but has just been crossing the river by feeling the stones. There are some truth to it. The Chinese Communist Party might not know everything they need to do in building an economically powerful empire, but they have been crystal clear about one thing from the very beginning, that is, the Party has to be the sole ruler of the country and this can NOT be changed. Has America got China wrong from the very beginning? I had a discussion with Mr. Bill Gertz, senior editor of the Washington Free Beacon.
蕭茗（Host/ Simone Gao）：「美國從一開始就誤判了中國嗎？為什麼？」
「Has America been wrong about China from the beginning? 」
Bill Gertz（《華盛頓自由燈塔》資深編輯）：「是的， 我認為尼克松政府對中國的戰略性開放，實質是一個戰略性賭博。換句話說，這是打中國牌反對蘇聯，它在當時是有其合理性的。還曾一度被認為是一個偉大的外交勝利。理查德·尼克松屬於反共強硬派，他因為這項政策受到了保守派的批評。該政策的問題在於，蘇聯早已在1991年解體，但是美方從未重新檢討對華政策。就好像開車不看路，而這就是我認為美國政策失敗的地方。他們基本上犯了一個巨大的戰略錯誤，他們認為通過全方位的交往， 就能與這個擁有核武器的共產獨裁大國，達成真正的戰略夥伴關系。他們沒有從根本上理解中國共產主義制度的本質。」
Bill Gertz:「 Yes, I do. I think that the strategic opening to China under the Nixon administration appeared to be what I would call a strategic gambit. In other words, this was the China card against the Soviet Union, and it had its place at the time. It was considered a great foreign policy success. Richard Nixon had been a very strong anti-communist, and he took criticism from his conservative supporters for opening up to China. The problem with that policy was that, once the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, there was never a reevaluation of the China policy. And that’s – it was kind of on autopilot, and that’s where I think that American policy went off the rails. They basically made a huge strategic mistake by thinking that – by engaging — unfettered engagement with a nuclear-armed communist superpower dictatorship, that this was somehow going to lead to a real strategic partnership. They didn’t fundamentally understand the nature of the communist system in China. 」
一直以來追逐利益的商界，主導了美國對華政策將近二十年，結果如何？教訓如何？
Coming up, a profit-driven business sector had dominated the U.S.- China policy for almost 20 years. What’s the result and what are the lessons learned?
美中蜜月因中共1989年在天安門屠殺爭取民主的學生和市民告一段落。鎮壓後，共產黨關閉了大部分出版物，抓捕了成千上萬的運動參與者和同情者，發動了反西方的影響力運動，暫時停止了經濟改革。鄧小平敏銳地發現危險，即共產黨統治即將出現的經濟衰退，堅持認為中國將繼續其改革開放政策，這句話是美國人最希望聽到的。
The 1989 Tiananmen massacre of the pro-democratic students and citizens by the Chinese Communist Regime put a pause on the U.S.- China honeymoon. After the crackdown, the Communist Party closed a big percentage of publications, arrested tens of thousands of movement participants and sympathizers, waged an anti-western influence campaign and temporarily stalled the economic reform. Deng Xiaoping who keenly spotted the danger as, an imminent economic recession posed to the Communist Party’s rule, insisted that China would continue its economic reform and opening up policy, a line the Americans were eager to hear.
學生運動被鎮壓後不久，老布什總統就授權向中國繼續運送此前所承諾的軍事物資。
他說：「我相信民主力量將克服天安門廣場上的這些不幸事件。」
Right after the student movement, President George H. W. Bush authorized the promised delivery of military supplies to China. He said: 「I am convinced that the forces of democracy are going to overcome these unfortunate events in Tiananmen Square.」
比爾·克林頓在競選中聲稱將對中國採取強硬態度。然而，他上臺後的強硬立場並沒有持續多久。根據邁克爾·皮爾斯伯里的說法，中國以統戰手段在克林頓政府內發動了一個支持中共的聯盟，以促進他們與中國在商界的盟友之間的聯繫，在華盛頓為中國的利益發聲。中國官員以商業交易誘惑有影響力的美國商人。克林頓競選活動的主要捐助者直接遊說總統，要求他不要破壞波音飛機向中國人的銷售前景，或阻止在中國火箭上發射美國商業衛星，這可能給美國政府節省數億美元。
Bill Clinton campaigned on being tough on China. However, his tough stance did not last long after he took office. According to Michael Pillsbury, China mobilized a pro-China coalition within the administration to facilitate contact between them and China’s allies in the business community, and to promote China’s interests in Washington. Chinese officials dangled commercial deals before influential American businessmen. Major donors to the Clinton campaign lobbied the president directly, asking him not to jeopardize the prospective sales of Boeing aircraft to the Chinese or to stand in the way of launching American commercial satellites on Chinese rockets, which would save the U.S. government hundreds of millions of dollars.
此外，從選舉人的經濟利益出發，中共在國會得到了新的支持。到1993年底，這些中共盟友說服總統放鬆他的反華立場。
In addition, new support was mobilized in Congress, based on constituents’ economic interests. By the end of 1993, these allies persuaded the president to relax his anti-China stance.
剩下的故事已成為歷史，克林頓政府幫助中國加入世界貿易組織，並授予中國最惠國待遇。之後，外國投資湧入中國並提高了國民生產總值。中國成為世界工廠和第二大經濟體。然而，與此同時，她並沒有成為一個擁抱民主價值觀的更加自由的社會。共產黨政權反而利用外國技術幫助發展其超級防火牆和其它設備來加強控制和迫害中國人民。
The rest of it is history, the Clinton administration helped China enter the World Trade Organization and granted the Most Favored Nation status to China. Following that, foreign investment poured into the country and boosted its GDP. China became the world factory and the second largest economy. Meanwhile however, it has not become a freer society that embraces democratic values. The Communist Regime largely used foreign technological help to develop its great firewall and other apparatus to control and persecute the Chinese people.
蕭茗（Host/ Simone Gao）：這場失敗的原因是什麼？教訓是什麼？請聽我和Gertz 先生的探討。
蕭茗（Host/ Simone Gao）：「從20世紀90年代到奧巴馬時代，美國對華政策深受本國跨國公司和大財團的影響。 現在，我們終於看到這一政策帶來的長期影響了，商界為利益所驅動、主導公共政策這一模式，讓美國深受其害。為什麼會走到這種地步呢，這種情況會再次發生嗎?」
「 From the 1990 to the Obama era, America’s China policy had been heavily influenced by American international corporations. Now finally, we start to see the long term impact of this policy. A model in which a profit-driven business sector dominates public policy has brought great damage to the country. What do you think is wrong with this model and will it happen again?」
Bill Gertz（《華盛頓自由燈塔》資深編輯）：「我的觀點是， 這麼多年來我一直在發出警告。從20世紀80年代開始，再到2000年我出版《中國威脅》一書，從一開始我就堅持認為，對華根本政策是錯誤的。以前的政策，部分基於這樣的考量：如果美國與中國開展貿易，這種貿易和商業互動會產生緩和性影響，最終讓中國實現從一個共產主義國家向一個民主國家的轉變。從80年代開始，30多年來，這種假設一直支撐著美國的對華政策。現在證明：這種政策從根本上就錯了。現在，我們沒有看到中國變緩和了；沒有看到中國在朝著民主制度轉變。事實是，我們看到的恰恰相反。這就是那些人常說的第二次婚姻，其對勝利的希望強盜可以忘記過去的經驗。你不能把國家安全政策建立在希望的基礎上，他們以前就是這麼幹的，就是這麼希望通過與中國做貿易，讓中國變得更加愛好和平、更加民主、更加開放。」
「 My views, I’ve been sounding the alarm on what I call the China threat for many years, going back to the 1980s and with my 2000 book The China Threat. And I’ve argued since the beginning that the fundamental approach to China has been mistaken. And that approach has been partly that, if the United States trades with China, this trade and business interaction will have a moderating influence and ultimately result in the evolution of China from a communist state to a democratic state. And that assumption has been the underpinnings of American policy for more than 30 years, going back to the ‘80s. And it’s proven to be fundamentally false. We have not seen a moderating of China. We have not seen an evolution towards a democratic system. In fact, we’ve seen just the opposite. This is the – what they often say about second marriages, that it’s the triumph of hope over experience. You can’t build a national security policy based on hope, and that was what they did in hoping that trading with China would bring about a more peaceful and a more democratic, more open China.」
蕭茗（Host/ Simone Gao）：「我在想，是不是錯就錯在一廂情願上了。美國大公司的貪婪又是怎樣一種情況呢。思科、微軟、他們在中國都賺了好多錢了。」
「 I wonder if the fault is all on wishful thinking. How about the greed of big American corporations. Cisco, Microsoft, they all made big money in China by doing so. 」
Bill Gertz（《華盛頓自由燈塔》資深編輯）：「至於說他們，我想沒有人真的去翻翻他們的賬簿，看他們到底在中國賺了多少錢。在中國，無論你幹哪一行，都會受到嚴格的限制。中國人需要美國把技術大量的轉讓給他們，他們對在華的美國企業施加了令人難以置信的限制。我再重複一次，從商界角度來看，他們是基於希望，希望不管怎麼樣吧，能夠進入14億中國人這一新興市場。我再說一次，他們是希望如此；我們還是回到商業領域來談，就是希望美國的資本主義理念能夠在中國廣為接受。不過，從某種意義上說，資本主義理念並沒有被廣為接受，特別是在中國領導人習近平的統治之下，我們看到中國在意識形態問題上走得更遠了，在共產主義的立場上變得更加強硬了。」
「 They – I wonder, nobody’s ever looked at their books to see how much money they’ve made in China. Every business is heavily restricted in China. The Chinese require massive transfers of American technology, they put incredible restrictions on American companies over there. Again, it’s – from the business community standpoint, it was based on the hope, this hope that somehow they could gain access to this emerging market of 1.4 million – billion people in China. And the hope was that, again, let’s try to get them into the business sphere and hope that this idea of American capitalism will catch on. Well, it hasn’t caughten on, in a sense that, especially under Chinese leader Xi Jinping, we’ve seen a retrenchment towards a much more ideological and much more hardline communist position. 」
蕭茗（Host/ Simone Gao）：「我對思科有一些瞭解。上世紀90年代末，思科總裁主動與中國的國家領導人接觸。思科為中國『防火長城』的設計奠定了基礎，還幫助中國完成『金盾』工程，並向中國出售設備。我明白企業就應該賺錢，不能讓企業承擔太多的道德責任。但是，當一個受利益驅動的行業竟然驅動公共政策的時候，是否會遭遇忽視、甚至損害國家長遠利益、價值觀方面的風險嗎?」
「 I know something about Cisco. Its president reached out to the Chinese leaders in the late 1990s. Cisco laid the design foundation for China’s Great Firewall, helped China with the Golden Shield project and sold equipment to China. I understand businesses are supposed to make money and you can’t put too much moral burden on them. But when a profit-driven business sector is driving the public policy, would we run into the risk of neglecting or even compromising the long term interest and values of the country?」
Bill Gertz（《華盛頓自由燈塔》資深編輯）：「是的，太有可能這樣了。我認為他們，首先這麼說吧，美國許多科技公司開始意識到了，與中國做生意是一件風險很高的事。風險在哪裏呢? 風險在於，中國將竊取它們最重要的專屬秘密，即它們的行業秘密和經濟秘密。我想，這一點對很多在中國做過生意的公司來說，確確實實比以前更明顯一些了。針對這一點，我們看到川普政府在採取比較大的反擊措施。美國貿易代表辦公室通過採取一些行動，對此提出了一份報告。他們一直在非常積極地反擊。其中一個原因是，美國許多公司的老闆找到美國政府說，你看，我們的秘密不知不覺的就被中國偷去了，所以我們需要採取一些措施來保護我們的技術。因為現在，技術確實是推動美國工業和經濟發展的引擎。」
Bill Gertz:「 Yes, very much so. I think their – first of all, many of the American technology companies are beginning to understand that doing business with China is a high-risk enterprise. And what is the risk? The risk is that China will steal their most important proprietary secrets, their industrial and economic secrets. And that’s really, I think, becoming a little bit more clear to a lot of companies that have done business in China. Under the Trump administration we’re seeing a major pushback against that. Through a number of actions, the U.S. trade representative office did a report on this. They’ve been very aggressive in pushing back. And part of the reason for that is that many of the American business leaders have approached the U.S. government in saying, look, we’re being stolen blind by China. We need to do something to protect our technology because it is really the engine for America’s industry and economy right now. 」
接下來，川普總統的對華政策大反轉，以及過去40年的對華政策教訓是什麼？
Coming up, the overhaul of China policy under President and what’s the lesson to be learned about China from the past 40 years?
在奧巴馬執政期間，以亞洲為樞紐的政策開始成型。當時的國務卿希拉里·克林頓發表了一篇關於外交政策的文章 – 美國太平洋世紀。半年後，國防部長萊昂帕內塔提出了亞太再平衡大綱，表明美國海軍將把10％的船隻和潛艇部署到太平洋。到2020年，60％的美國海軍將部署在太平洋周圍。一年後，他的繼任者查克·哈格爾宣布，60％的美國空軍也將部署在亞太地區。下一任國防部長阿什頓·卡特保證美國將繼續增加該地區的軍事力量預測。2016年2月，美國和其它11個國家簽署了跨太平洋夥伴關係協定，許多觀察家認為這將減少簽署國對中國貿易的依賴，使其更接近美國。
Narration: During the Obama administration, a pivot to Asia policy was formed. The then secretary of State Hillary Clinton published an article on Foreign Policy- America’s Pacific Century. Half year later, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta presented an Asia-Pacific Rebalance outline that indicated the U.S Navy would deploy 10% of its ships and submarines to the Pacific ocean. By 2020, 60% of the American Navy will be deployed around the Pacific Ocean. One year later, his successor Chuck Hagel announced that 60% of the American Air Force will also be deployed in the Asian pacific region. Ashton Carter, the next secretary of defense in line assured that America would continue to increase its military power projection in the region. In February 2016, the United States and 11 other countries signed Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement which many observers believed would reduce the signatories’ dependence on Chinese trade and bring them closer to the United States.
但人們仍然沒有意識到奧巴馬時代中國政策的根本變化。在唐納德·川普總統就職後，這種情況迅速改變。
But people still didn’t sense a fundamental change of China policy in the Obama era. This changed quickly after President Donald Trump took office.
2018年8月13日，川普簽署了2019年度「國防授權法案」（NDAA）。這項價值7.16千億美元的國防政策為軍事部門的武器升級提供資金，增加了現役軍人的力量，並列出一些對美國安全構成戰略性挑戰的國家，中國位列前茅。
(NDAA) for 2019. The 716-billion-dollar defense policy funds weaponry upgrade across military branches, increases the active duty forces and addresses a number of countries that pose strategic challenge to America, among which, China, took a front seat.
NDAA表示，國防部長將不允許中國參與南海地區的海軍演習，直到中國停止所有填海擴島活動，撤出南海地區所有武器，並一直致力於穩定該地區連續四年之前。
The NDAA states that the Secretary of Defense won’t allow China to take part in naval exercises in the South China Sea area until China halts all land reclamation activities, removed all weapons, and has consistently acted towards stabilizing the region for four consecutive years.
NDAA還擴大了其年度中國軍事和安全發展報告的範圍，包括通過投資、工業、網絡管理和學術界進行的間諜活動和技術轉讓。它增列了中國為影響媒體、文化、商業、學術、和政策社區所做的努力，以及其在海外用以支持其安全和軍事目標的非軍事工具。
The NDAA also expanded the scope of its annual China military and security development reports to encompass espionage and technology transfers through investment, industry, cybertheft, and academics. It added China’s efforts to influence media, culture, business, academic, and policy communities, as well as its nonmilitary tools overseas to support its security and military objectives.
該法案還擴大了其針對中國的戰略，將以整體政府戰略制衡中國破壞民主體制和進程的計劃。
The bill also expanded its China strategy to include a whole-of-government strategy addressing China’s efforts to undermine democratic institutions and processes.
這些更加詳細的關於中國的新增內容反映了近年來共和黨和民主黨，以及美國社會其它群體迅速達成的共識。那就是—— 中國是主要的競爭對手，而不是合作夥伴。對川普總統而言，這與他對中國的公開對抗態度是一致的，當時他卻因此而招致批評。
These more detailed China additions reflect the consensus that both political parties and other sectors of the American society have quickly reached in recent years. That is – China is a major rival instead of a partner. For president Trump however, it is in line with his openly confrontational approach to China which had drawn criticism at the time.
川普總統當選以來曾多次打破與中國的外交先例。他接受了臺灣總統蔡英文的賀電，並祝賀她當選 。這是自1979年美國斷交以來，臺灣領導人和美國領導人之間的第一次聯繫。相反，川普總統從未祝賀中國國家主席習近平當選，儘管他說他與習主席關係良好。
Since his election, President Trump has broken diplomatic precedence regarding China on several occasions. He accepted a congratulatory phone call from Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen, where he also congratulated her on her election victory. It was the first known call between a Taiwanese leader and a U.S. leader since the U.S. severed diplomatic relations in 1979. In contrast, President Trump never congratulated Chinese President Xi Jinping on his election, despite saying he has good relations with President Xi.
川普總統還質疑北京的「一個中國」政策，這是中國的底線之一。
President Trump also questioned Beijing’s 「One China」policy which is one of China’s bottom lines.
川普（美國總統）：「我完全理解『一個中國』的政策，但我不知道為什麼我們必須接受『一個中國』的政策，除非我們與中國達成協議，包括貿易在內的其它事情。我不想中國對我發號施令。」
President Trump: 「I fully understand the 『One China』 policy, but I don’t know why we have to be bound by a 『One China』policy unless we make a deal with China having to do with other things, including trade。I don’t want China dictating to me. 」
在對中國的另一次反擊中，川普總統簽署了「臺灣旅行法案」。他恢復了美國與臺灣官員之間的高層互訪。由於1979年簽署的中美聯合公報，這些訪問停止了。有一點值得注意的是，「臺灣旅行法」於2016年首次提出，但未經國會通過。兩年後，國會一致通過了。
In another pushback against China, President Trump signed the Taiwan Travel Act. It resumes the high-level visits between Taiwanese and the U.S. officials’. These visits stopped as a result of the Sino-US joint communiques signed in 1979. One thing to note is that the Taiwan Travel Act was first proposed in 2016 but it was not passed by the congress. Two years later, the congress passed it unanimously.
川普政府與前政府之間的政策差異並未停留在外交層面。在川普的執政下，美國海軍增加了在中國人造軍事島嶼所在的有爭議的南中國海的巡邏。整個奧巴馬政府期間僅僅進行了四次巡邏，在川普總統領導下，巡邏增加至每月兩到三次。
Policy differences between the Trump administration and previous administrations don’t stop at the diplomatic level. Under Trump, the U.S. Navy has increased its patrols in the disputed South China Sea where China’s man-made military islands are located. There were four patrols conducted during the entire Obama administration; under President Trump, patrols have increased to two or three per month.
最後，川普總統開始了與中國的貿易戰。通過對抗中國不公平的貿易行為和知識產權盜竊，川普政府有效的打亂了中共主導的經濟模式。
And finally, President Trump started the trade war with China. By confronting China’s unfair trade practices and intellectual property theft, The Trump administration, in effect, is disrupting China’s Communist Party dominant economic model.
蕭茗（Host/ Simone Gao）：美國對華政策在川普領導下正在發生巨變，川普走在正確的路上嗎？再次有請葛茨先生。
蕭茗（Host/ Simone Gao）：「你怎麼看川普最近簽署的這個2019國防授權法案？」
「 What do you think of the NDAA (National Defence Authorization Act)2019 that President Trump signed into law recently?」
Bill Gertz（《華盛頓自由燈塔》資深編輯）：「我認為新的國防授權法案邁出了重要的一步，就是川普政府給新的中國政策定調。新的政策最先在白宮的國家安全策略中畫出輪廓。好像是在2017年12月，然後就有了新的國防戰略，今年1月份出來的。這兩個文件，幾十年來頭一次，將中國定性為戰略對手。這是一種外交說法，說的是中國不再會被接納為支持民主，支持資本主義的國家。所以我認為新的國防授權法在幾個領域把這種新戰略寫成文字。現在對這個法案有一些反對聲音。比如，對中國問題最常發聲的參議員之一的Marco Rubio, 對這個投了反對票，因為這個法案沒有包含他一直推動的對中國電信公司的限制。那是由於川普政府和中國做出的一個交易，移除了對中國電信公司的限制。但是從積極方面看，我們看見這個法案真的會加強和臺灣的關係，我認為這是川普政府的一個重要的戰略步驟、合作。」
「 I think the latest National Defense Authorization Act is a very important step forward in codifying the new approach to China by the Trump administration, which has been outlined in, first, the White House national security strategy. I think that was in December of 2017, then followed by the new national defense strategy, which came out in January of this year. And those two, for the first time in decades, identified China as a strategic competitor, which is a diplomatic way of saying that it’s no longer accepted that China is going to become a pro-freedom, a pro-capitalist nation. And so I think that the NDAA for the first time has kind of codified that new strategy in a number of areas. Now, there are some minuses to it. For example, Senator Marco Rubio, who is one of the most outspoken on the issue of China, voted against the measure because it did not contain restrictions on Chinese telecommunications companies that he was advocating. And that was as a result of a Trump administration deal with China which removed U.S. sanctions on Chinese telecommunications. But on the positive side, we see that this has really called for strengthening U.S. relations with Taiwan, which I think is a real important strategic move by the Trump administration，Cooperation. 」
蕭茗（Host/ Simone Gao）：「是什麼讓川普在中國問題上和前些任的總統不一樣？」
「 Right, what’s the thing about Trump that makes him different from previous presidents in dealing with China?」
Bill Gertz（《華盛頓自由燈塔》資深編輯）：「有意思，我研究這個總統，他的政策，我注意到最早到2012年，川普那時候想著競選總統，他寫了一本書。那本書裡，他就談到要在中國問題上和美國商界走不同路線。尤其是專注於，而不是忽略，中國的人權迫害問題。還有當然，從生意角度看，中國的不公平貿易問題。我認為那個是總統的新政策的首要原動力。」
Bill Gertz: It’s very interesting. I’ve studied the president, the current president’s policies, and I noticed that as far back as 2012, Trump first wrote a book when he was thinking about running for president in that time, and in that book in 2012, he talked about breaking with the American business community on China, specifically, really focus – not ignoring, no longer ignoring China’s human rights abuses and, of course, from a business perspective, China’s unfair trade practices. So that has really been, I think, for the president, the prime impetus for his new policy.
蕭茗（Host/ Simone Gao）：「白邦瑞先生的書對於美國影響中國的能力，勾勒出一個悲觀的圖景。書裡說美國誤判中國40年。但是我想問另一個問題，是不是中國也同樣誤判美國40年？他們大規模偷竊美國技術和經濟成果，但是他們是不是理解美國強大的來源是哪裡？如果他們既不明白什麼讓美國強大，也瞧不上這個，美國是不是需要擔心中國會成為一個長期存在的超級力量？這些問題你怎麼看？」
「 Mr. Pillsbury’s book paints a rather pessimistic picture of America’s ability to influence China. It talks about how America has got China wrong for four decades. But I would like to ask another question – Has China misunderstood America for four decades as well? They stole a great amount of American technologies and economic strategies, but do they understand where the true strength of America come from? If they neither understand what had made America great nor appreciate it, does American need to worry they will become a long-lasting super power in the world? What’s your thinking on these questions?」
Bill Gertz（《華盛頓自由燈塔》資深編輯）：「首先，我認為從北京的角度來看，1991年的蘇聯解體，是當時中共領導人的警鐘。他們明白如果不做出改變，就會像蘇聯一樣垮掉。那時當然他們已經開始了80年代的改革開放。但是我認為那隻不過是想讓共產主義再次強大。我覺得那是他們追求的。他們修改了共產主義的經濟系統，但是他們不修改共產主義意識形態，像是強大的中央集權，對內的高壓維穩。這些是他們不能放棄的共產主義的關鍵特徵。他們害怕的是如果他們在那幾個方面放鬆管制，轉向一個相對民主的政權，他們就會和蘇聯一樣的結局。但是在經濟層面，喊著致富很好的口號，讓我們都變富裕， 現實是，腐敗滋生，這是中國的現狀，還有貧富懸殊。沿海城市和精英階層在這種制度中受益，而國家的其它部分卻在貧困和泥淖中萎縮，這是中國不能解決的內部矛盾。還有他們還要面對那種體制的價值觀流失，在很多公共領域共產主義價值觀流失，但是他們也承認，沒有內部的價值體系。這個曾經被認為是資本主義的一個問題，但是觀察一下20世紀早期的資本家，他們基本上有宗教或是基督教的價值體系，他們尋求更多的善，怎麼樣能惠及全社會。這樣的一個價值系統，我看在中國也沒有，我認為中共領導層知道這個問題。他們曾經對新加坡的一黨專政或是一黨制政治體制做過研究，還有日本，尋找凝聚他們的價值觀，結果沒找到。所以在當下的中國，我看在原教旨型共產主義和半資本半社會主義中間的這個中國政治體制，是有巨大矛盾的。」
「 Well, first off, I think that from the Beijing perspective, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 was a wake-up call in that the Chinese leadership understood that they had to make changes in the system, otherwise they were destined, like the Soviet Union, to collapse under a communist system. Now, they had already begun the reform and opening up process in the ‘80s before that, but I think that that was – they were basically set on a course designed to make communism great again. And that’s kind of their – from my perspective – that’s kind of what they were after. And they – so they modified the communist economic system, but they have not modified the communist ideological system: strong central control over everything, internal security, repression. These are the key features of the communist system that they are unable to give up. And their fear is that if they loosen on that and move towards a more democratic state, that they will end up like the Soviet Union. But yet on the economic side, the watchword was, yeah, it’s great to be rich, let’s all get rich. But as it turned out, with rampant corruption, as it is in China today, that there’s great disparities in wealth. You have coastal cities and elites benefitting from the system, where the rest of the country is languishing in poverty and squalor. So this is an internal contradiction that China has not been able to deal with. And they’re also dealing with a lack of values in that system, in that they’ve moved away in many public forms from endorsing hard-line communism. But they also recognize that there’s no internal values system. This was considered a problem for capitalism, but when you look at the capitalists in the early part of the 20th century, they had basically religious or Christian value systems, which oriented their – they looked for the greater good, how could they benefit the whole of society. Where this is a kind of a value system, that I see, that it’s lacking in China. And I think the Chinese leadership understands this. They’ve studied one-party dictatorships or one-party political systems in Singapore, somewhat in Japan, looking for that values system that can hold what they have together, and they haven’t found it. So I see great contradictions within the current Chinese systems between what you have as a hard-line, ideological communist system on the one hand and a quasi-capitalist, semi-socialist. 」
蕭茗（Host/ Simone Gao）：根據法國政治哲學家亞力克西斯得托克維爾的說法，美國民主經驗有三個核心特徵、地方自治、民間協會和宗教，他還認為自由社會依賴公共道德，個人可以從理性或宗教中獲取道德指導，但社會的和諧只能依賴宗教來實現，如果這是真的，在中國、在很大程度上，兩者都不存在。我們不知道美國模式是否是最好的治國模式，但它使這個國家繁榮了242年。中國人民曾經擁有過大智慧，但是共產主義嚴重扭曲了今天中國人的思想，以至於即使共產主義在意識形態上已經消亡，其影響依然存在。在共產主義的影響被徹底消除之前，中國可能沒有機會成為一個持久的世界超級大國。感謝你收看《世事關心》，我是蕭茗，我們下週再見。
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Producer：Simone Gao
Writer：Simone Gao
Editors：Julian Kuo Bonnie Yu Frank Lin Bin Tang
Narrator: Rich Crankshaw
Cameraman：Wei Wu
Transcription: Jess Beatty
Translation：Frank Yue Michelle Wan Bin Tang Guiru Zhang
Special Effects：Harrison Sun
Assistant producer：Bin Tang Sherry Chang Merry Jiang
Feedback：[email protected]
Host accessories are sponsored by Yun Boutique
New Tang Dynasty Television
August, 2018
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